


Chapter 18: Protection



- Goals of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection



Operating System Concepts


18.1

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Protection


- Operating system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.



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Domain Structure

- Access-right = $\langle \text{object-name}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$
where *rights-set* is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
- Domain = set of access-rights

D_1 D_2 D_3

$\langle O_3, \{\text{read, write}\} \rangle$
 $\langle O_1, \{\text{read, write}\} \rangle$
 $\langle O_2, \{\text{execute}\} \rangle$

$\langle O_2, \{\text{write}\} \rangle$ $\langle O_4, \{\text{print}\} \rangle$ $\langle O_1, \{\text{execute}\} \rangle$
 $\langle O_3, \{\text{read}\} \rangle$

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
Domain Implementation (UNIX)

- System consists of 2 domains:
 - User
 - Supervisor
- UNIX
 - Domain = user-id
 - Domain switch accomplished via file system.
 - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit).
 - When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.

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Domain Implementation (Multics)

- Let D_i and D_j be any two domain rings.
- If $j < i \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$



Multics Rings

Access Matrix

- View protection as a matrix (*access matrix*)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- $Access(i, j)$ is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain _{i} can invoke on Object _{j}

Access Matrix

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	

Figure A

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Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do “op” on object O_j , then “op” must be in the access matrix.
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection.
 - ↪ Operations to add, delete access rights.
 - ↪ Special access rights:
 - owner of O_j
 - copy op from O_i to O_j
 - control – D_i can modify D_j access rights
 - transfer – switch from domain D_i to D_j

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Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
 - Mechanism
 - ▢ Operating system provides access-matrix + rules.
 - ▢ If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
 - Policy
 - ▢ User dictates policy.
 - ▢ Who can access what object and in what mode.

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Implementation of Access Matrix

- Each column = Access-control list for one object
 Defines who can perform what operation.
 - Domain 1 = Read, Write
 - Domain 2 = Read
 - Domain 3 = Read
 - ⋮
- Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
 Fore each domain, what operations allowed on what objects.
 - Object 1 – Read
 - Object 4 – Read, Write, Execute
 - Object 5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

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Access Matrix of Figure A With Domains as Objects

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			

Figure B

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Access Matrix with Copy Rights

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute		

(a)

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute	read	

(b)

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Access Matrix With Owner Rights

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		read* owner	read* owner write*
D_3	execute		


(a)

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		
D_2		owner read* write*	read* owner write*
D_3		write	write

(b)

Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch control
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	write		write		switch			




Revocation of Access Rights

- *Access List* – Delete access rights from access list.
 - Simple
 - Immediate
- *Capability List* – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked.
 - Reacquisition
 - Back-pointers
 - Indirection
 - Keys





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Language-Based Protection



- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.



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Protection in Java 2



- Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
- A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM.
- The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform.
- If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can be performed by the library.

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Stack Inspection

protection domain:	untrusted applet	URL loader	networking
socket permission:	none	*.lucent.com:80, connect	any
class:	<pre>gui: ... get(url); open(addr); ...</pre>	<pre>get(URL u): ... doPrivileged { open("proxy.lucent.com:80"); } <request u from proxy> ...</pre>	<pre>open(Addr a): ... checkPermission(a, connect); connect (a); ...</pre>

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