


Chapter 15: Security



(slides improved by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)

Operating System Concepts – 8th Edition,

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Chapter 15: Security


- The Security Problem
- Program Threats
- System and Network Threats
- Cryptography as a Security Tool
- User Authentication
- Implementing Security Defenses
- Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks
- Computer-Security Classifications
- An Example: Windows XP

(slide modified by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)

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15.2

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The Security Problem

- **Security**
 - must consider **external environment** of the system
 - **protect** the system resources

- Terminology
 - **Intruders** (crackers) attempt to breach security
 - **Threat** is potential security violation
 - **Attack** is attempt to breach security
 - ▶ Attack can be accidental or malicious
 - ▶ It's easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse



(slide modified by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)



Security Violations

- Categories
 - **Breach of confidentiality**
 - ▶ Unauthorized reading of data
 - **Breach of integrity**
 - ▶ Unauthorized modification of data
 - **Breach of availability**
 - ▶ Unauthorized destruction of data
 - **Theft of service**
 - ▶ Unauthorized use of resources
 - **Denial of service**
 - ▶ Preventing legitimate use of a service
 - ▶ E.g. distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks




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Security Violations


- Methods
 - **Masquerading** (to breach **authentication**)
 - ▶ Participant in a communication pretends to be someone else (see next slide)
 - **Replay attack**
 - ▶ Malicious or fraudulent repeat of a valid transmission
 - ▶ Message modification
 - **Man-in-the-middle attack**
 - ▶ Attacker between sender and receiver, masquerades as sender to the receiver, and vice versa (see next slide)
 - **Session hijacking**
 - ▶ Intercepting an active communication



(slide improved by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)



Standard Security Attacks





Security Measures at Four Levels

- **Security** must occur at four **levels** to be effective:
 - **Physical**
 - ▶ Lock access to machine rooms, terminals, etc.
 - **Human**
 - ▶ Assure that only appropriate users have access
 - ▶ Avoid **social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving**
 - **Operating System**
 - ▶ Protection mechanisms!
 - **Network**
 - ▶ Secure communication (more important than ever!)

- Security is as weak as the weakest line in the chain!



(slide improved by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)



Common Program Threats

- **Trojan Horse**
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
 - ▶ Be careful about your search path in your shell (\$PATH!)
 - **Spyware**, pop-up browser windows, covert channels
- **Trap Door**
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Could be included in a compiler
- **Logic Bomb**
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
 - ▶ E.g. specific time, or when no longer in employee list
- **Stack and Buffer Overflow**
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers) (see next slides)




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Program with Buffer-Overflow Condition



```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER_SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
    if (argc < 2)
        return -1;
    else {
        strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
        /* ... do something */
        return 0;
    }
}
```



(slide modified by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)



Layout of a Typical Stack Frame



(slide modified by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)




Short Code Segment to start a Shell

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    execl("\bin\sh", "\bin\sh", NULL);
    return 0;
}
```

Attacker


- Writes the above program
 - which starts an interactive shell with all permissions of its environment
- Compiles the program into assembly code
- Manipulates binary to fit the target stack frame, see next slide!
- Feeds binary as argument to the program with buffer-overflow condition
- Gains full interactive access!




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Hypothetical Stack Frame



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Computer Viruses


■ Virus

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- For example, borne via email or as a *macro* in documents
 - ▶ e.g. Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()  
Dim oFS  
Set oFS = CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')  
vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format c:'' ,vbHide)  
End Sub
```

■ Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system

- e.g. a Trojan horse, or
- infected disk, memory stick




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Computer Viruses

■ Many categories of viruses exist, literally many thousands of viruses


- File
- Boot
- Macro
- Source code
- Polymorphic
- Encrypted
- Stealth
- Tunneling
- Multipartite
- Armored
- ...



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A Boot-Sector Computer Virus



System and Network Threats



- **Worms** – use **spawn** mechanism; standalone program
- Example: **Morris internet worm**
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote shell, *rsh*) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
 - **Grappling hook** program uploaded main worm program (see next slide)
- **Port scanning**
 - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- **Denial of Service**
 - **Overload** the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
 - **Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS)** attacks come from multiple sites at once





The Morris Internet Worm

- 1988, Cornell University, Robert Morris, Jr.
 - Exploited flaws in the Unix operating system



(slide modified by R. Doemer, 03/07/11)